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Abstract
As suggested by the title of Shoham, Powers, and Grenager’s position paper [Y. Shoham, R. Powers, T. Grenager, If multi-agent
learning is the answer, what is the question? Artificial Intelligence 171 (7) (2007) 365–377, this issue], the ultimate lens through
which the multi-agent learning framework should be assessed is “what is the question?”. In this paper, we address this question by
presenting challenges motivated by engineering applications and discussing the potential appeal of multi-agent learning to meet
these challenges. Moreover, we highlight various differences in the underlying assumptions and issues of concern that generally
distinguish engineering applications from models that are typically considered in the economic game theory literature.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we address the question “if multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?” posed in [34]
by looking at the engineering agenda. As opposed to the descriptive agenda that tries to explain micro or macro
economic phenomena using simple learning rules, or the predictive agenda that tries to forecast what could happen,
the engineering agenda concerns designing systems that would satisfy certain pre-specified performance criteria. The
purpose of multi-agent learning from an engineering perspective is therefore to assist in the design of a complex
system that includes multiple agents.
From an engineering point of view, as we argue below, one of the main benefits of multi-agent learning is its
potential applicability as a design methodology for distributed control, which is a branch of control theory that deals
with design and analysis of multiple controllers that operate together to satisfy certain design requirements.
In this paper, we motivate the use of multi-agent learning in these domains in Section 2 as a means to simplify the
design process of a distributed control system while reducing the complexity of each controller, taking uncertainty
into account, and allowing for distributed interactions between the controllers. Issues that distinguish the engineering
view of multi-agent learning from the descriptive and predictive views are discussed in Section 3. We finally provide
an outlook to the engineering agenda and the challenges that it poses to multi-agent learning in Section 4.
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The problem of designing optimal (or even just reasonable) distributed control systems is notoriously difficult.
Examples of complex engineering problems include scheduling in manufacturing systems [2,16,24,25], routing in data
networks [3,4,26,30,31], and command and control of networked forces in adversarial environments [1,9,29]. These
applications entail a collection of dispersed interacting components that seek to optimize a global collective objective
through local decision making. The task is complicated by limited communication capabilities, local and dynamic
information, faulty components, and an uncertain, if not hostile, environment. In general, it is not feasible to pass
all information to a command center that could process this information and disseminate instructions. Furthermore,
even if this were possible, the complexity of the overall system would make the problem of constructing a centralized
optimal policy intractable.
It is both the complexity and distributed nature of these problems that motivate the use of game theoretic methods.
A multi-agent viewpoint lets one look at an overall systems as a collection of simpler interacting components. Note
that this means choosing to impose a multi-agent structure as a design approach. The result is that the decision
making process for any single component is dictated by an optimization problem that is greatly simplified as compared
to the centralized problem, but coupled to the decisions of other interconnected components. Accordingly, a Nash
equilibrium reflects an optimality condition from the perspective of each individual component, but need not reflect
optimal operation from as a collective. Nonetheless, the possibility of the system to self-organize into a suboptimal
Nash equilibrium is less daunting than the prospect of constructing a centralized optimal policy.
3. Descriptive, predictive, or engineered?
It is safe to say that much of the research in multi-agent learning has its roots in the economic game theory literature.
Accordingly, it is also safe to say that this literature did not intend to offer a design methodology for engineered
systems. This does not mean that material, e.g., as in the many excellent monographs on learning in games [15,37,
38] or evolutionary games [32,35], cannot be a source of methods for engineered systems. Rather, it underscores
the importance of recognizing “what is the problem?” when considering this material for a multi-agent approach for
designing engineering systems.
That stated, this section presents selected issues that can be distinguishing characteristics of multi-agent learning
in engineered designs. In particular, we will see that various notions that play a descriptive or predictive role in the
economics literature become design considerations when considering a multi-agent learning approach.
3.1. Defining the game
We have suggested that multi-agent learning may be an effective approach to the problems described earlier. And
yet, we have yet to define a specific game in which to apply multi-agent learning methods. Recall that an important
motivation for taking a multi-agent perspective was alleviating complexity. This means that the basic elements of
players, strategy spaces, and player utilities are all design considerations when imposing a multi-agent framework.
The operations of agents in reactive environments that change with time is an important reality a design method-
ology must face. The type of game that is chosen to capture such dynamics can be either a one-shot game, a repeated
game, or a stochastic game. Choosing a one-shot game implies that we ignore the dynamics of the problem. A repeated
game offers a richer structure by reflecting the consequences of a strategy over multiple time steps. This suggests using
regret minimizing techniques such as [7]. Stochastic games are a more natural model to model dynamics. Learning
in this context is quite complex, as shown by [20], in the context of getting to a Nash equilibrium and by [28] in the
context of regret minimization.
Finally, once players and strategy spaces have been specified, another design consideration is defining agent utility
functions. As with most design specifications, there is considerable latitude in specifying suitable utility functions.
Even in the ideal case of an agreeable centralized objective, there are important considerations in “distributing” this
objective among the different players. Ref. [36] contains a general discussion, which is applied to vehicle target
assignment in [6].
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There is a significant amount of work on multi-agent learning devoted to characterizing limiting behaviors of var-
ious algorithms (e.g., [17]), and in particular, determining whether behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium or to
some other desirable target set. Given the historical role of Nash equilibrium as a predictive concept of social interac-
tions, it should not be surprising that there are accompanying analytical1 investigations into how a Nash equilibrium
might emerge. Quoting Arrow [5],
“The attainment of equilibrium requires a disequilibrium process”.
We believe that the correct context to view work such as [13,14,18,19,21,33] is in terms of understanding how a
plausible disequilibrium process can converge to Nash equilibrium.
The importance of Nash equilibrium in engineered systems requires different justifications. The generality of the
Nash equilibrium concept is such that a desirable solution can be expressed as a Nash equilibrium, but for some
appropriately defined game. For various reasons, this “ideal” game is not the setting used in applying the multi-agent
learning setup (cf., the preceding discussion on defining the game).
Another issue worth mentioning is the complexity of finding and describing a Nash equilibrium. If the computation
of a Nash equilibrium is NP-hard, or even if the complexity is just high, any learning algorithm cannot really hope to
get to a Nash equilibrium. For example, in [22] an equilibrium of a certain graphical game is computed via a message-
passing algorithm. This algorithm is quite complex, so it seems that a learning scheme that converges to it will have
to be at least as complex. This hampers the idea of mitigating complexity by using learning in situations where the
complexity of learning a Nash equilibrium is high.
3.3. Performance, convergence, and averages
Much of the work on learning in games concerns characterizing the behavior of various learning mechanisms (cf.,
[17,38]) in terms of a limiting equilibrium set, e.g., Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, Hannan consistency set, etc.
This is reasonable, particularly in the absence of a specific application domain to assess the performance in terms of
domain specific criteria.
If a Nash equilibrium does indeed reflect a desirable operating condition, then learning methods that steer behaviors
to equilibrium are well motivated. An example for routing in networks is [10], which derives a routing algorithm that
leads to the desirable Wardrop equilibrium, which, in an appropriate context, is a Nash equilibrium. But convergence
of learning algorithms should not be a goal by itself from the engineering point of view. Indeed, it is possible that
convergence can result in an efficiency loss, in terms of player utilities, versus the non-convergent scenario [27].
A related concern is characterizing performance in terms of averages. Concepts such as correlated equilibrium, no
regret, and calibration, all reflect asymptotic and averaged measures. In settings that reflect “steady state” operations,
then average performance criteria are appropriate.
There are, however, situations in which average performance criteria are not adequate. An obvious example in
military operations. In the absence of very large teams, then worst case, or at least risk averse, performance measures
are more appropriate. A similar concern for routing in networks is the presence of emergency (911) and other critical
network traffic. It is certainly possible to use simulated multi-agent learning off-line as virtual experiments to tune
a decision making policy. But even with this usage, there is still a need for a multi-agent learning framework that
provides guarantees on something stronger than averaged performance.
3.4. Limited information and costly communication
An important consideration in multi-agent systems and multi-agent learning in particular is the information avail-
able to each agent. An example is whether agents have access to the actions of other agents or only their own individual
payoffs, thereby distinguishing action-based from payoff-based learning algorithms [38]. Another, somewhat more
1 As well as experimental, e.g., [11].
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results in so-called “uncoupled” learning and can have important consequences on the resulting limiting behaviors of
certain classes of learning dynamics [18]. We should comment that a functional expression of utility is often unavail-
able for both engineered and economic systems, making on-line payoff-based learning a necessity.
For engineered systems, the information available to each agent is a design consideration that is influenced by the
specific domain. This is in stark contrast to a descriptive social model, where the information flow is dictated by the
particular modeled setting. A good example is knowledge of the utility function of other agents. In an engineering
application, where agents are programmed components, this knowledge can simply be communicated, albeit at some
cost, among agents. In social modeling contexts, where utility reflects an agent’s underlying intent, such communica-
tion of utility cannot be assumed.
3.5. Learning dynamics and bounded rationality
There is a substantial (and growing) number of different adaptation mechanisms for multi-agent learning. For de-
scriptive social models, there is an interest in understanding how agents (humans) learn in games (e.g., [11]). This may
explain why most dynamics in the economic literature require very little real-time processing capability. In contrast,
in engineered systems agents are programmed components, and so the specification of learning dynamics becomes
yet another design choice. Indeed, if one views feedback control systems (e.g., [8]) as a form of sequential decision
making, asking whether a controller plausibly reflects human decision making is almost never a consideration.
Along these lines, let us take the notion of “bounded rationality” simply to mean limitations on the processing
capacity of individual agents. In this context, the specific application domain dictates the boundaries of bounded
rationality, and hence, the set of feasible learning dynamics. Depending on the real time rate of decision making, the
result is a wide spectrum of possibilities, ranging from computationally intensive processing to simple decision rules.
Our list of engineering design considerations in multi-agent learning is far from comprehensive, and will continue
to grow as long as economic methods continue to be explored for engineering problems. One example is the growing
interest, particularly in the networking literature, in applying concepts from mechanism design. Starting from [23]
the idea of providing incentives via pricing has become extremely attractive in the theoretical networking commu-
nity. Recent results (e.g., [31]) present a simple mechanism leading to bounded efficiency loss with respect to social
optimality. Still, engineering such a mechanism seems like a formidable task.
4. Concluding remarks: The engineering agenda
As we argued above, the engineering agenda in multi-agent systems is rather different than the economic game the-
ory agenda. In this section, we describe two additional aspects that are particularly important for engineered systems:
robustness and domain knowledge.
Robustness, in the classical sense of control theory, means the resiliency of a system to variation in the parameters
of nature or the expected input. In order for multi-agent learning to be used in real engineering systems it must possess
some robustness properties. There are several aspects of robustness that are important for engineered systems. First,
robustness implies that there are some performance guarantees that would hold even under the worst circumstances.
This can be done, perhaps, using the online learning scheme [12] where the regret is minimized and some performance
guarantees are provided. Second, robustness implies that one can guarantee performance with respect to some set of
specifications. This means that if we restrict the set of opponents and the actual environment to belong to a certain set
of possible opponents and environments, we can guarantee some performance levels. Finally, robustness is perhaps
most important in the dynamical setup, where there might be transient disturbances. In this case, a design goal may
be to guarantee that the performance as measured per time period never deteriorates below a certain level.
Domain knowledge is a vital element of systems engineering specification. Currently available multi-agent learning
algorithms are typically extremely simple and they do not take domain knowledge into account. While this might be
appropriate for the prescriptive agenda, some engineering systems allow the agents to use considerable resources.
Efficiently using domain knowledge in the design process of multi-agent learning algorithms is critical to making
these algorithms effective and, in particular, to scaling them up beyond illustrative academic problems. Efficient
incorporation of domain knowledge in planning and in artificial intelligence in general is a long standing challenge.
Due to the complexity of the interaction between multiple decision makers, developing rigorous methods to describe
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Possible specification technologies can range from symbolic languages to mathematical models. The specification
of domain knowledge should represent a tradeoff between the amount of details needed to describe the model and
interactions reliably and the complexity of the description.
We close with the comment that an article, such as this one, that dwells on caveats and challenges can easily come
across as overly pessimistic. Quite to the contrary, we do believe that the multi-agent learning framework, stemming
from the economic game theory literature, offers considerable promise for important engineering problems, and we
look forward to seeing this direction continuing to blossom in the years to come.
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